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SUMMARY
• We run a standard income convergence analysis for the last decade and confirm an already 
established finding in the growth economics literature. EU countries are converging. Regions in 
Europe are also converging. But, within countries, regional disparities are on the rise. 
• At the same time, there is probably no reason for EU Cohesion Policy to be concerned with what 
happens inside countries. Ultimately, our data shows that national governments redistribute 
well across regions, whether they are fiscally centralised or decentralised.
• It is anyway difficult to establish if Structural and Cohesion Funds play any role, good or bad, in 
the recent growth convergence patterns we describe for Europe. The literature on the topic is 
inconclusive.  Generally,  macroeconomic  simulations  produce  better  results  than  empirical 
tests. It is thus possible that Structural Funds do not fully realise their potential either because 
they are not efficiently allocated or are badly managed or are used for the wrong investments, 
or a combination of all three.
• Nevertheless, a few regularities emerge in the literature and partially also in our empirical test. 
EU funds contribute to growth convergence i) if used in a supportive institutional environment, 
ii) in the presence of a decent industrial structure and some R&D intensity, and iii) when used 
for soft and not just hard investment.
• To the extent that the EU should not be concerned with regional disparities in each country (or 
not all of them), a larger share of the EU budget should go to countries instead of regions at any 
level of development.
• Structural  and  Cohesion  Funds  should  be  used  in  particular  i)  to  reinforce  (rather  than 
substitute) Governments’ geographical redistribution schemes, ii) to compensate losers from 
product market liberalisation, iii) to guarantee that SMEs have access to local credit, iv) for the 
purpose of supporting sectoral  re-allocation in the whole country or across regions in each 
country.  Disparities  stemming  from  geography  and  efficient  concentration  of  economic 
activities in well served regions should not be treated.
• Ex-ante institutional conditionality is important for the success of EU-funded investment, as 
suggested in the Commission’s proposal for 2014-2020. Cohesion money should be allocated 
to countries that respect EU laws especially those pertaining to the single market and display a 
good record in the transposition of EU directives. At the regional level,  technical assistance 
represents an important instrument for improving institutional capacity. 
• Standard income analysis has but  limits when  it  comes to assess the effectiveness of  EU 
cohesion spending. As the objective of the post-1988 Cohesion Policy is to raise the marginal 
efficiency of capital in the periphery, any ex post assessment should also concentrate on this 
particular dimension and be juxtaposed to income convergence analysis. 
• Structural Funds to rich regions should be allocated either by looking at the marginal efficiency 
of capital in each region, a condition that maximises the return to investment, or on a purely 
competitive basis by means of open calls.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The EU uses about one third of the EU budget to run Cohesion Policy with the objective of promoting the 
Union’s “overall harmonious development” and in particular “reducing disparities between the levels of  
development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions”1. This is done 
under the general assumption that market forces are unable to deliver such a result, for one reason or 
the other.
Reducing regional disparities in income (ie output) levels alludes to the fact that the distribution of 
σincome  should  become  more  equitable  over  time.  Economists  use  the  expression  -convergence 
(sigma-convergence) to indicate that income is distributed more equally across regions (or countries) 
compared with the past. But the objective of reducing “the backwardness of the least favoured regions” 
signals  that  EU  Cohesion  Policy  is  also about  fighting  underdevelopment  and  poverty  traps  in  the 
regions that are the least likely to take advantage of economic liberalisation2. Economists use the term 
β-convergence  (beta-convergence)  to  describe  the  catching-up  process  whereby  poor  regions  (or 
countries)  grow  faster  than rich ones  to  approach  the  “common  income  level”3 β.  The  concept  of  -
convergence is the empirical counterpart to the neoclassical growth model,  for which investment is 
higher in low-income regions (or countries) given increasing returns to capital, which explains why – all 
else being equal – they shall grow faster than high-income regions where investment in fact generates 
decreasing returns to capital.
EU Cohesion Policy is largely a redistributive policy with eighty percent of all Structural and Cohesion 
Funds going from rich to poor regions of Europe4. However, the objective of the modern EU Cohesion 
Policy is not simple income redistribution. In one official document published in 2001 it is stated that 
“cohesion  policies  are  aimed  at  increasing  investment  to  achieve  higher  growth  and  are  not  
specifically  concerned  with  expanding  consumption  directly  or  with  redistribution  of  income”5. 
Structural and Cohesion Funds are meant to increase returns to investment in the periphery through 
the  provision  of  collective  goods  such  as  infrastructures,  information  networks,  research  and 
development,  better  skills,  etc6. The goal  of investing for growth in the periphery is embedded in a 
distinct vision of the impact of market liberalisation on inequalities that owes to the new economic 
growth models emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in substitution of  the neoclassical growth model: 
regions  that  are  advanced promise  higher  rates of  return  to  investment  than  regions  that  are less 
advanced due,  for  example,  to the presence of  a  minimum  stock of  physical  capital  and/or  public 
infrastructures.  Mobile  production  factors  are  attracted  towards  them,  which  would  create 
agglomeration effects, enhancing the divide between the core and the periphery7.
Whether EU cohesion policy can deliver on growth convergence and economic growth in general  is 
important  for  at  least  two  reasons.  First,  European  leaders  have  repeatedly  advocated  the  use  of 
Structural  Funds  to  stimulate  growth  in  vulnerable  countries,  especially  those  under  financial 
assistance (ie Greece,  Portugal).  Their actual capacity to generate growth and the conditions under 
which  this  is  more  likely  to  happen  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  recent  proposals  are  truly 
relevant. Second, emphasis has been recently put on the idea of transforming the EU budget into an 
1 Art.174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
2 The next section describes how the link between economic integration and equity has been differently conceptualised 
over time.
3 This is a somewhat vague expression to refer to what economists call the long-run steady state.
4 Eighty percent of cohesion spending agreed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2007-13 serves in fact 
the so-called convergence objective, providing Structural Funds to regions, whose GDP per capita is below 75 percent of 
the EU27 average and Cohesion Funds to countries, whose GDP per capita is below 90 percent of the European average. 
5 European Commission (2001), p.177.
6 Hooghe (1998). 
7 See for example Krugman (1991).
2
instrument for growth and the same approach dominates the proposal of the European Commission for 
the  next  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (MFF)  2014-20,  which  is  under  negotiation.  The 
“redistribution of growth opportunities”8 is not the sole objective of EU cohesion policy. Rich regions 
receive funding too. Sixteen percent of EU cohesion spending is earmarked for relatively high-income 
regions to improve their competitiveness and employment conditions.9 Whether EU funds are growth-
enhancing also in the advanced regions is as important as their capacity to contribute to the catching 
up of the less advanced regions10. 
In this paper we provide updated evidence on σ β and -convergence in Europe so as to verify whether 
the recent empirical evidence is consistent with the final objectives of EU Cohesion Policy. However, 
the crucial question is if Structural and Cohesion Funds play any role in the multifaceted process of 
convergence currently taking place in Europe. The existing research on the growth effects of EU funds is 
rather  inconclusive.  In  general,  macroeconomic  simulations  produce  better  results  than  direct 
empirical tests. This suggests that Structural Funds have the potential to generate growth but they do 
not (or not enough) either because they are inefficiently allocated11 or poorly managed or used for the 
wrong investments. We will discuss the different approaches that have been used in the literature and 
the main reasons why their results differ so much from each other. The review of the literature is also 
an opportunity for providing an analytical tool-kit to assess the performance of EU Cohesion Policy in 
the  light  of  its  intended  purposes.  The  discussion  will  also lead  us  to  question  the  opportunity  of 
sticking  to  simple  income  convergence  analysis  when  analysing  growth  dynamics  in  EU-funded 
regions.
This paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 describes how the remit of  EU cohesion policy has 
evolved over time. As policy effectiveness is a function of the intended objective, it  is important to 
explain what EU cohesion policy is trying to achieve today compared with the past. Section 3 provides 
original evidence on the evolution of regional disparities in Europe. Section 4 is a meta-analysis of the 
literature that has studied the growth effects of Structural Funds. Section 5 provides an analytical tool-
kit for assessing EU cohesion policy and provides policy recommendations for the future. 
2. THE HISTORICAL PHASES OF EU POLICY
Whether EU Cohesion Policy is effective or not depends on its explicit objectives. Whilst EU Regional 
and later Cohesion Policy has been mostly about the elimination of income disparities and the fight 
against  regional  underdevelopment,  the  EU  approach  has  changed  over  time  along  a  number  of 
significant  dimensions:  i)  the  assessment  of  prevailing  market  conditions;  ii)  the  belief  about  the 
direction in which market forces push; iii) the underlying economic model that predicts such direction: 
iv)  the  type  of  disparities  that  might  naturally  emerge,  whether  small  or  large;  v)  the rationale  for 
intervention; and vi) the policy instruments12.
Concern for disparities is already expressed in the Treaty of Rome (1957), where it is stated that “the  
aim  of  the  community  is  to  develop  throughout  the  community  a  harmonious  development  of  
8 We use this expression to convey the idea that EU Cohesion Policy is indeed a redistributive policy but is not concerned, 
as explained above, with the mere redistribution of income from rich to poor countries.
9 Finally, four percent goes to 'territorial cooperation', which is thematic and independent of recipient countries relative 
income levels.
10 It should be noted that the criteria for distributing funds to rich regions are not explicit. Funds for the objective of regional 
competitiveness and employment are given to all regions that do not qualify for convergence money, formally as a 
function of size. But there is no explicit efficiency criterion, for example. Indeed Santos (2011) shows that there is no 
relationship between the size of funds received by each rich region and the return to capital in each region. 
11 For a critical assessment, see for example Santos (2011).
12 See Table 1 in Appendix.
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economic  activities,  a  continuous  and  balanced  expansion,  an increased stability,  an accelerated  
raising  of  the  standard  of  living  and  closer  relations  between  its  Member  States”13.  The  European 
Economic Community (EEC) of  the  late  1950s was meant  to foster  market integration  through the 
elimination of all existing barriers to trade. It was believed that free markets would lead to convergence 
in income levels, as in the predictions of the neoclassical growth model, and that only some categories 
of workers may be left out of the process, which explains why the only fund that was conceived at the 
time was the European Social Fund (ESF). Moreover, at this very early stage of the integration process, 
the relevant unit of analysis was mostly the country. 
It was soon realised that the free-market scenario was an imperfect representation of the European 
common market, which in the 1970s remained highly fragmented due to the persistence of other non-
tariff barriers ranging from technical standards to exchange rates and consumer preferences. At the 
time, the underlying theoretical model was still the neoclassical growth model, often combined with the 
technological gap literature. The former assumes that poor regions grow faster than rich ones because 
decreasing returns to capital imply that investment is remunerative only if the capital stock is low. The 
technological gap literature assumes, in a similar fashion, that poor regions grow faster than the others 
but  just  because they imitate technology  produced at  high costs elsewhere.  Whilst  the theoretical 
assumption is still  that  free markets deliver convergence, actual market fragmentation implies that 
some regions are likely to suffer from economic integration more than others if, for example, poorer 
regions do not have access to external capital due to the presence of barriers to capital mobility and the 
free movement of banking services, whilst rich ones have the option of using their own local capital. 
The  EU  regional  policy  that  developed  in  the  1970s  and  marked  by  the  creation  of  the  European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975 shifted the focus of attention from countries to regions 
and aimed at providing compensations or side-payments to potential losers. 
The late 1980s are associated with a paradigm shift in the understanding of growth dynamics and in 
the appreciation of regional policies. The Cohesion Policy of the EU as we know it came into existence in 
1988  shortly  after  the  enlargement  of  the  EC  to  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece.  It  was  meant  to 
complement the project for the completion of the Single European Market (1987-92). At the time it was 
in fact believed that market integration increases regional disparities, as mobile factors of production 
move  to  core  developed  regions  where  returns  to  investment  are  highest14. In  other  words,  the 
neoclassical growth model was substituted or rather associated with the endogenous growth theory 
and  the  new  economic  geography  literature,  according  to  which  free  markets  inevitably  generate 
agglomeration  effects  (ie  income  disparities)  because  economic  activities  tend  to  concentrate  in 
technologically advanced areas. The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 introduced the term “cohesion” 
and subsequent reforms in 1988 and 1993 significantly augmented the size of the new Structural and 
Cohesion Funds. The rationale for intervention was thus different from the past. EU Cohesion Policy 
does not provide compensations to losers but aims to create the conditions  for increased returns to 
investment also in  the periphery through the provision of  collective goods such as infrastructures, 
information networks, research and development, better skills, etc15.
Today’s EU cohesion policy is largely indebted to the reform of 1988. Free markets are believed to 
generate  agglomeration  effects  with economic activities  concentrating  more in some areas than  in 
others. But compared with the past, the official  view is that it is also important to raise the Union’s 
overall growth potential, which alludes to the fact that concentration of some types of investment in 
technologically advanced regions should not be excluded a priori16. 
13 Art.2 of the Treaty of Rome.
14 Padoa Schioppa (1987).
15 One strong argument was that, by doing so, EU Cohesion Policy would also contribute to creating a more efficient single 
market, see Hooghe (1998).
16 There is obviously a tension between the efficiency and the equity objective of EU Cohesion Policy, see for example 
Martin (1999); Canova and Boldrin (2001).
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3. RECENT CONVERGENCE TRENDS 
Convergence is the process that describes the progressive elimination of disparities in income levels. 
σ βThe growth economics literature has isolated two types of convergence: - and -convergence17. The 
former indicates whether the distribution of income across regions (or countries) has become less or 
more uneven over time. The latter describes the mobility of income within the same distribution and 
tackles the question of whether poor regions (or countries) have grown faster than the others. 
The results from convergence analysis are normally used to test for the validity of the neoclassical 
βversus  the  endogenous  growth  model.  The  neoclassical  growth  model  predicts  -convergence, 
independently of whether there is no capital mobility, partial capital mobility or full capital mobility18. 
On the other hand, the endogenous growth model predicts divergence under full capital mobility. It is 
not anymore true that there are decreasing returns to capital.  By contrast, high capital stocks are a 
guarantee of ever increasing returns, which explains why, under capital mobility, factors of production 
tend to move towards rich (high-capital-stock) areas where the return to investment is highest, thereby 
enhancing  the  divide  between  the  core  and  the  periphery.  Some  more  recent  literature  however 
questions the usefulness of convergence analysis  to test  theoretical  growth models19.  This  is  also 
because  convergence  may  be  consistent  with  the  endogenous  growth  model  under,  at  least,  two 
assumptions.  First,  the mobility  of  factors of  production is impaired.  Second,  economies  are multi-
sector,  with  the  result  that  convergence  may  occur  if  divergent  developments  in  one  sector  are 
cancelled out by developments in another sector20.
3.1.σ-convergence
We assess here whether  the distribution  of income has become more or  less equitable in the last 
fifteen years. Chart 1 (a) looks at the dispersion of GDP per capita expressed in purchasing power 
standards (PPS) across European countries from 1995 to 200921. We distinguish between euro area 
and non euro area countries to see whether enhanced mobility of factors of production, supposedly 
higher within the euro zone, leads to more or less intra-area convergence. Cross-country dispersion in 
income has been on the downside in the last decade across the Union as a whole. The fall in dispersion 
is slightly more pronounced for non euro zone countries. The result is not necessarily consistent with 
the neoclassical growth model, for which deeper market integration leads to faster convergence. But it 
is also true that non euro zone countries in this period entered the single European market, of which a 
single  currency  is  only  one,  albeit  important,  element.  The  evidence  speaks  in  favour  of  a  more 
equitable distribution of income also across European regions22. 
17 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992); Sala-i-Martin (1996).
18 See for example Sala-i-Martin (1996).  
19 Magrini (2004).
20 For example, rich regions engaged in manufacturing activities may continue attracting capital because initial levels of 
technology and quality of human capital importantly affect the size of the return to investment. On the other hand, poor 
regions may attract capital for investing in real estate, a sector for which there is not the sustained process of 
cumulative growth described in the “new economic geography” literature. Ultimately, figures on GDP per capita may 
reveal a convergence pattern but the setting in which this happens is consistent with the one envisaged by endogenous 
growth models, with capital attracted by expected returns from investment in the high-productivity manufacturing 
sector.
21 The variable is expressed in logs.
22 We do not control here for country-fixed effects.
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CHART 1: DISPERSION OF GDP ACROSS COUNTRIES (a) AND REGIONS (b), 1995-2009
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Source: Bruegel based on data from EUROSTAT.
Figures in Chart 1 also suggest that the convergence trend is less pronounced when using regional 
rather than country-level data. This is because national average GDP levels have grown closer to the EU 
average largely thanks to the strong performance of core regions in each country, but within countries 
regional income levels continue to diverge, which explains why the convergence pattern is more timid 
when pulling all regions together. This interpretation is confirmed by within-country regional data. Chart 
2 (a) provides evidence of rising within-county dispersion in regional GDP per capita. All in all, whilst 
income is more equally distributed across European countries and regions, it is less equally distributed 
across regions in the same country23. 
In Chart 2, we also provide figures for disposable income. The comparison between GDP and disposable 
income per capita allows us to determine the extent to which fiscal policy variables are responsible for 
regional redistribution patterns in each country. Figures in Chart 2 (b) shows that the dispersion in 
disposable income (after taxes and benefits) is lower than GDP dispersion, confirming that national 
governments perform an important redistribution function across regions24. There is furthermore no 
clear evidence that fiscally decentralised countries are better capable of redistributing across regions 
than fiscally centralised countries25.
23 This pattern is not new and has been already detected for previous periods, see for example Barca Report (2009).
24 Other analyses come to the same findings, see Checherita, Nickel and Rother (2009).
25 There is a growing body of empirical literature studying the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and regional 
inequalities. Large samples do not show any correlation, similarly to what we find here, but the relationship becomes 
significant when accounting for the level of development. Only in high-income countries is decentralisation associated 
with a more equal inter-regional income distribution. In middle- and low-income countries, decentralisation comes with 
greater regional equalities, see Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010). 
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CHART 2: DISPERSION OF REGIONAL GDP AND DISPOSABLE INCOME WITHIN COUNTRIES, 1995-2009
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3.2.β-convergence
σ βEvidence of -convergence suggests that there must be also -convergence26. This is evident in the 
case of countries. Over the last decade the new Member States that started from below-average income 
levels have grown much faster than high-income countries. We limit the analysis to European regions, 
as the current EU Cohesion Policy is primarily concerned with developments at the regional level27. We 
also restrict the sample to the period 2000-09 to account for the fact a large number of countries (and 
in turn regions) joined the EU just at the beginning of the twenty-first century28.
We find the expected negative sign between initial GDP levels and the growth rate of GDP per capita, 
βwhich is an indication of (moderate) unconditional  convergence across European regions (see Chart 
3).  However,  the  neoclassical  growth  model  builds  on  a  very  restrictive  assumption,  namely  that 
regions  are  identical  but  in  the  initial  level  of  income.  It  seems  but  more  realistic  to  assume  that 
European  regions  vary  from  each  other  in  terms  of  levels  of  technology,  preferences  for  saving, 
βpopulation growth, etc. Economists use the expression conditional  convergence to indicate that poor 
regions grow faster than rich ones, after having controlled for other structural differences across them. 
βWe produce a simple test of conditional  convergence by dividing our sample into three groups of 
regions under the simplifying assumption that regions in each group are relatively similar to each other 
in terms of the three most important conditioning variables identified in the literature (ie technology, 
propensity to save and population growth). We assume that structural differences, some at least, are a 
function  of  how each region  compares with the rest  of  the EU in  terms of  initial  income  level  (eg 
technology and saving preferences). The three groups are as follows: regions with GDP per capita below 
75 percent of the EU27 average; those with GDP per head between 76 and 90 percent of the rest of the 
26 Sala-i-Martin (1996).
27 With the exception of the Cohesion Fund specifically designed for lagging countries.
28 This is also when they started receiving cohesion funding from the EU.
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EU; and a third group with GDP per capita above 100 percent of the EU27 average. This classification is 
relevant also because it mimics the eligibility criteria used to allocate EU funds to regions. In addition, it 
speaks to the literature that has identified “convergence clubs” or clusters in Europe, for which there is 
not a linear relationship between the initial level of income and successive growth rates but cut-offs (or 
break points) that justify the grouping of countries (or regions) into clusters29.
Chart  3 relates initial  levels of  GDP per capita with growth over 2000-09. A  convergence pattern is 
visible  across the  whole  sample  but  the three  groups behave differently.  Low-  and middle-income 
regions are on a convergence path with each other. High-income regions are instead relatively stable. If 
anything,  they display a timid divergence pattern,  implying that very rich regions grow faster  than 
relatively less rich regions. Chart 4 displays the exact same analysis using disposable income as a 
variable. Interestingly enough, fiscal transfers are such that they convert the slight divergence pattern 
in  rich  regions  into  convergence.  As  above,  the  redistributive  function  of  national  fiscal  policies  is 
confirmed. Chart 5 uses yet another variable: GDP per capita relative to the EU27 average. The sign of 
the correlation is confirmed but the relationship between the initial GDP per capita and its growth rate is 
much weaker. There is a mathematical explanation behind it. The dynamics of absolute GDP per head 
suffers from a problem known as “reverse to the mean”, for which extreme values of one variable would 
look  less  extreme  on  a  second-round  observation,  for  almost  a  law  of  nature,  which  implies  that 
absolute  levels  overstate  convergence.  By  contrast  relative  GDP  does,  in  a  sense,  control  for  the 
reverse to the mean by constructing a value in relation to the average in the same observed population. 
29 Quah (1996).
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βCHART 3: -CONVERGENCE OF GDP ACROSS GROUPS OF NUTS-2 REGIONS, 2000-09
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βCHART 4: -CONVERGENCE OF DISPOSABLE INCOME ACROSS GROUPS OF NUTS-2 REGIONS, 2000-09
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βCHART 5: -CONVERGENCE OF RELATIVE GDP ACROSS GROUPS OF NUTS-2 REGIONS, 2000-09
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We have estimated growth dynamics econometrically and are thus able to say something also about 
the size or strength of convergence. We find that low-income regions converged at an annual rate of 3.7 
percent between 2000 and 2009, middle-income regions at 8.5 percent, whilst high-income regions 
display a divergence pattern but this is in fact not statistically significant30. However, when accounting 
for country-fixed effects, results change. Low-income countries are diverging internally at annual rate 
of 1.7 percent31. High-income countries also diverge, and the outcome is now statistically significant, 
yet at a lower 0.6 percent per year. The only countries that have been converging internally are middle-
income countries, where the annual rate is 5.4 against 8.5 percent when country fixed effects are not 
accounted for32. These results corroborate a point made earlier: whilst European regions are converging 
with  each  other,  regions  in  each  country  are in  most  cases  diverging  from each other  (except  for 
countries that are mostly populated by middle-income regions). 
There may be numerous explanations behind the fact that middle-income countries have been able to 
reduce regional  disparities  at  home at  an  annual  rate  that  is  much  above standard estimations  at 
around  2  percent  a  year33.  The  neoclassical  model  predicts  faster  convergence  under  full  capital 
mobility. Examples of countries populated by middle-income regions are Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
EMU may have fostered convergence for these countries because investors thought their capital stock 
was sufficiently  low to be able  to  generate  increasing returns  to  investment  and/or  that  EMU was 
eliminating exchange rate but also default risks.
30 The results are based on a cross-section analysis and displayed in Table 2 (Appendix).
31 We talk here of countries because, with country-fixed effects, we are de facto looking at countries that are mostly 
populated by low/middle/high-income regions.
32 See footnote 30. 
33   This is the typical speed of convergence estimated by the literature, see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
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4. A META-ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON GROWTH EFFECTS 
Structural  and Cohesion  Funds  represent  a  significant  share  of  recipient  countries’  GDP.  Under  the 
2000-06 MMF, EU countries were allocated EU funds for an amount that was about 0.4 percent GNI, but 
reached 2 and 1.6 percent in Portugal and Greece respectively. The redistributive role of EU Cohesion 
Policy has become clearer after enlargement and the access into the Union of countries with income 
levels well below the EU average. Under the MFF running from 2007 to 2013, EU countries have been 
allocated average EU funds of about 1.38 percent of GNI,  with marked differences across countries 
depending on starting conditions. The new Member States were allocated 2.60 percent of GNI, whilst 
older  middle-  to high-income Member States were granted about  0.35 percent of  GNI,  a figure that 
would but be sensibly lower if Greece and Portugal were excluded from this group of countries34. All in 
all, the figures are comparable with the size of the Marshall Plan funds distributed to Europe after the 
second world war35.
The crucial question is whether Structural Funds have played any role in the convergence patterns we 
have  described  above.  This  question  speaks  to  the  vast  existing  (neoclassical)  literature  that  has 
attempted to quantify the impact of EU Cohesion Policy on growth convergence. The evidence is mixed 
and  largely  inconclusive,  being  very  much  dependent  upon  the  approach  and  model  specification 
used. The following sections discuss the practical problems each researcher has to face when trying to 
measure the growth effects of Structural  Funds; how the findings change depending on the way in 
which  practical  and  methodological  problems  have  been  solved;  whether  regularities  may  be  still 
detected in the findings that go beyond differences in the approach, and if important aspects pertaining 
to the role of EU Cohesion Policy have been ignored or under-investigated by the existing literature. 
4.1. Research problems
The exercise of estimating the growth effects of EU Cohesion Policy poses a number of methodological 
challenges. First, researchers need to find a way to disentangle the effects of cohesion support from 
market-driven dynamics given that the neo-classical model indeed predicts natural convergence even 
in the absence of external  interventions.  Fundamentally,  they need to define the baseline,  namely 
develop  a  method  for  establishing  the  regional  growth  dynamics  in  the  absence  of  EU  cohesion 
support. Once this is defined, the exercise is to calculate the deviation of GDP growth from the baseline 
in the presence of EU cohesion support. In a neo-classical framework, the exercise is simplified by the 
fact that the baseline is the growth rate conditional on a certain level of initial GDP and the growth effect 
of  Structural  Funds  the  extent  to  which the  rate of  convergence  deviates  from  the baseline  in  the 
presence of cohesion support. 
Second, researchers need to determine the counterfactual. Structural and Cohesion Funds are meant to 
finance medium- to long-term investments and not to subsidise consumption, which explains why they 
are normally modelled as shifts in investment. They have to build an assumption about whether EU 
support will add to existing public investment, partially substitute it or fully substitute it. Baseline and 
counterfactual are artificial constructions, which accounts for the fact that the literature may come up 
with dramatically different results. 
Third,  reverse  causality  is  a  serious  constraint  in  econometric  estimations.  So,  for  example,  large 
amounts of Structural Funds may be associated with high growth rates, but this may be due to the fact 
that  low-income regions,  which according to the neo-classical  model  grow faster  than high-income 
regions, receive proportionally more at the outset given that the allocation method is based on initial 
levels  of  GDP  per  capita  relative  to  the  EU average.  Moreover,  Structural  Funds  payments  may  be 
34 Greece was allocated 1.4 percent of GNI, and Portugal 1.9 percent.
35 Marzinotto (2011).
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associated with strong growth just because, in good times, regions (or countries) are better able to co-
finance projects and thus to mobilise Structural Funds payments. 
Fourth, EU-funded projects are meant to contribute to extending regions’ growth potential and thus tend 
to manifest their impact in the long-term, and especially so if they are used appropriately. This poses 
the question of when it is more appropriate to assess their growth effects. 
Fifth, there are problems with data availability, as there is little information on the actual time profile of 
spending  at  the  regional  level,  the  themes  and  sectors  each  region  is  investing  in,  and  local 
institutional variables that may hinge on the effectiveness of EU cohesion spending.
We discuss below how these problems have been addressed in the literature and with what results 
distinguishing between two different approaches to the study of the growth effects of EU Cohesion 
Policy: macroeconomic simulations and empirical estimations, and amongst the latter between indirect 
and direct tests.
4.2. Macroeconomic models
Macroeconomic models assess the potential impact of EU funds on economic growth but abstract from 
management  failures.  Moreover,  whilst  they  are  able  to  quantify  the  potential  growth  effects  of 
different forms of investment (eg infrastructure, R&D or human capital accumulation), they abstract 
from the actual allocation of EU aid across themes and sectors in each country. 
All  these  models  estimate  positive  growth  effects  from  cohesion  spending  but  their  size  changes 
depending on the theoretical assumptions upon which the model is based. The two most vastly used 
models  -  HERMIN and QUEST – produce very different  measures of  the so-called cohesion-support 
multiplier36.  The HERMIN model concentrates on the short-term demand effects of  additional  public 
investment,  whilst  QUEST  focuses  on  long-term  supply  side  effects.  Table  3  in  the  appendix 
summarises the main differences between the two models on the example of simulations conducted 
for  the  MFF  2000-06.  In  a  nutshell,  both  recognise  greater  gains  in  the  long-term  but  these  are 
proportionally  higher  in  the  QUEST  model.  Moreover,  the  size  of  the  multiplier  in  the  short-term is 
systematically higher for “Objective 1” or “convergence countries” in QUEST, whilst HERMIN does not 
unveil a divide between an Objective 1 and a non-Objective 1 context. Finally, the QUEST model is also 
explicit  about  short-  and  long-term  effects  of  different  forms  of  investments  and  predicts  that 
infrastructural  projects  have  the strongest  short-term effects,  and human  capital  development  the 
strongest long-term effects compared with all other forms of investment. 
4.3. Empirical tests 
Half-way between macroeconomic simulation and direct empirical  tests are studies that  base their 
evaluation  of  EU  Cohesion  Policy  on  indirect  evidence.  Researchers  would  first  test  the  economic 
impact of different  types of investment and then explain the growth effects of Structural  Funds by 
differentiating  between  the  types  of  projects  they  may fund.  By  and  large,  the  available  literature 
shows  that  the  most  growth-enhancing  investments  are  infrastructure  and  education37.  But,  as  in 
macroeconomic simulations, they abstract from the  actual  allocation of EU funds across themes of 
intervention and sectors.
36 Cohesion-support multipliers are calculated as the cumulative percentage deviation of GDP from the baseline divided by 
the cumulative percentage share of EU funds in national GDP.
37 De la Fuente and Gives (1995).
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Direct econometric estimations have the advantage of capturing the  actual impact of EU support on 
economic  growth,  accounting  for  both  management  failures  and  the  possibility  that  regions  (or 
countries)  have  picked  the  wrong  theme  of  intervention  or  sector.  Econometric  estimations  use 
country-level data, European regional level data, or regional data in each country. They may be based 
on  cross-section  analysis  or  (dynamic)  panel  data.  The  choice  of  the  unit  of  analysis  and  of  the 
estimation technique by themselves drives the results in one or the other direction.
Just  like  in  macroeconomic  simulations,  any  econometric  estimation  needs  to  account  for  the 
baseline. The standard approach is to apply a neo-classical setting and assume that the baseline is 
determined by the initial level of income. Structural Funds are then included in a linear regression38, so 
that positive results would suggest that EU funds support regions’  natural transition towards higher 
levels of income39. The majority of studies that use the neo-classical framework tend to find a positive, 
even  if  often  small,  impact  of  EU  funds  on  growth  convergence,  especially  in  “Objective  1”  or 
“convergence  regions”  (or  countries)40.  Positive  effects  in  poor  regions  are further  enhanced when 
accounting  for  spatial  effects  such  as  proximity  to  technologically  advanced  regions41.  There  is 
however no consensus in the literature. Other studies do not find that the rate of convergence has been 
higher in funded regions in comparison with non EU-funded regions42.  The choice of the control  (or 
conditioning) variables is of course crucial. Regional growth is affected by multiple factors. Unobserved 
or  omitted variables would lead to a biased estimate of the impact of Structural  Funds43.  The most 
common result is that Structural Funds contribute to growth convergence conditional on a number of 
other  features  ranging  from  national  membership44,  openness45,  a  relatively  advanced  industrial 
structure and R&D intensity46, fiscal decentralisation47, a high-quality institutional environment48, lack 
of corruption49, and a stable macroeconomic environment.
4.4. Some common findings 
In spite of the large variation in the results, one can still try to identify regularities in the evaluation of 
the growth effects of Structural Funds. These are as follows: 
• EU funds have a large growth potential but may not deliver in practice either because they are 
poorly managed or used for the wrong types of investment.
• EU funds indeed contribute to growth convergence but mainly in the presence of a supportive 
institutional environment50.
38
39 Some include an interaction between the initial level of income and Structural Funds so as to obtain a readable estimate 
of the size of the Structural-Funds coefficient, see for example Eggert et al (2007).
40 García Solanes J. and R. María-Dolores (2001); Becker et al (2008); Ramajo et al (2008) ; Gaspar and Leite (1994). 
Some researchers have isolated convergence regions to address reverse causality, for which the poorest regions 
receive relatively more than richer regions.
41 Dall’erba et al (2008); Mohl and Hagen (2008).  
42 Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996); Canova and Boldrin (2001); Dall’erba and Gallo (2008).
43 The recent rise in spatial analysis owes to the attempt of reducing the problem of omitted variables. 
44 Fayolle and Lecuyer (2000).
45 Ederveen et al (2003).
46 Bussoletti and Esposti (2004); Cappelen et al (2003).
47 Bähr (2008).
48 De Freitag, Pereira and Torres (2003); Ederveen et al (2006).
49 Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005).
50 The same finding is confirmed by studies looking at the economic impact of aid in developing countries (Burnside and 
Dollar 2000).
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• EU funds deliver positive effects or enhanced positive effects when used for investment in 
regions that have at least a basic industrial  structure and small  agricultural sectors, even if 
they are “Objective 1 regions”. 
• Not all  forms of investments deliver (long-term) growth effects. Macroeconomic simulations 
suggest that the strongest short-term growth effect comes from infrastructures; in the long-run, 
human capital accumulation and R&D are the most growth-enhancing forms of investment. 
• Empirical tests equally confirm that, in “Objective 1 regions”, only investment in human capital 
generates positive long-term effects on growth convergence51.
4.5. Missing links 
Most studies look at the impact of Structural Funds in isolation from other policies that have a regional 
dimension, such as redistribution by the central government, approved state aid and broader industrial 
policy initiatives.
There is also comparatively little attention to the types of projects that may be financed with Structural 
Funds.  Macroeconomic simulations provide an exact estimate of the potential  short-  and long-term 
effects of different types of investment, differentiating between infrastructure (or hard investment), 
R&D and human capital accumulation (or soft investment). Nevertheless, they abstract from the actual 
thematic  and  sectoral  allocation  of  Structural  Funds  payments  in  the  individual  regions.  Empirical 
studies have also ignored this dimension mostly due to limited data availability, with few noticeable 
exceptions52.  The  literature  gap  is  unfortunate  because  it  seems  plausible  to  imagine  that  growth 
effects raise as are also a function of the sector of investment, being possibly higher if used in sectors, 
for which a country (or region) has a comparative advantage (ie a natural endowment unexploited due 
to lack of finance) or a competitive advantage (ie an established value creating strategy that may or 
may not depend on natural resource endowment)53. 
One simplistic way to test for the impact of different forms of investment is by differentiating between 
EU Cohesion Policy Objectives, under the assumption that “Objective 1” or “convergence regions” will 
mostly use funds to finance hard investment and all  others to finance also or only soft investment 
projects. We find, for example, that in poor regions, where Structural Funds are mostly used to finance 
infrastructural  projects,  the  annual  rate  of  convergence  is  3.7  percent  against  a  more  robust  8.5 
percent in middle-income regions that arguably spend more on soft investment. The results change 
when accounting for national  membership and looking at inter-regional  disparities in each country. 
Hard-investment  (“Objective  1”)  countries  have  witnessed  a  rise  in  inter-regional  disparities.  Only 
countries that have a predominance of regions whose GDP is between 75 and 90 percent of the EU27 
average display a clear convergence pattern across all model specifications, which suggests that GDP 
convergence in each country is facilitated by a mixture of hard and soft investment in countries that 
start already from a minimum (threshold) stock of physical and human capital54.
Researchers generally find that EU funds contribute to growth convergence in low-income regions but 
not or less so in high-income regions. Such a result is mostly driven by the fact that the estimate is 
done in a neo-classical framework, in which it is assumed that there is a linear negative relationship 
βbetween initial GDP level and growth rates. And yet, as we show with our data on  convergence, the 
51 The size of the effect is likely to depend on the degree of labour mobility.
52 See Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004),  however the authors  use commitments in different priority areas rather than 
actual spending, and Checherita, Nickel and Rother (2009), where instead actual expenditures are accounted for. 
53 Concentrating investment in sectors in which a country or region has a competitive advantage implies that some 
agglomeration may indeed occur, but not all agglomerations are to be fought.
54 The test is run using panel analysis (with country and time fixed effects). The results are available upon request.
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relationship is clearly non-linear implying that a different modelling is required, which would lead to 
potentially different results55.
Linked  to  the  point  made  above,  most  empirical  tests  study  the  impact  of  EU  Cohesion  Policy  on 
income convergence. However, one thing is to support the transition of regions towards their respective 
steady-state and another is to truly contribute to long-term growth (ie productivity) at any level of 
development.  There  is  comparatively  little  research  that  has  attempted  to  quantify  the  growth  (or 
productivity) effects of Structural Funds in advanced regions56. 
5. AN ANAYTICAL TOOL-KIT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the discussion above, we provide here an analytical tool-kit for assessing the effectiveness 
of EU Cohesion Policy and some tentative policy recommendations for the future. 
5.1. A tool-kit for researchers
First, the standard way of testing for the validity of the neo-classical versus the endogenous growth 
model suffers from theoretical problems. By way of example, we have suggested that convergence is 
compatible with the literature on agglomeration effects under two conditions. First, there are limits to 
the mobility of factors of production. Second, economies are multi-sector, so that developments in one 
sector cancel out developments in another one. In turn the risk is that, at the country-level, an income 
convergence  trend  hides  failures  in the  operation  of  the  European  single  market  and/or  reflects  a 
process of inefficient reallocation across sectors57. Thus, income convergence is not always a positive 
outcome, potentially hiding inefficiencies that tap the overall growth potential of an area, counter to the 
principle of allocative efficiency. This is a significant limitation considering that one of the purposes of 
the post-1988 Cohesion Policy was to raise returns to investment in the periphery, with the objective of 
making the single market more efficient.
Second, not only is income convergence analysis not appropriate to test for the validity of different 
growth models, but it is also not the best tool to assess the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy. The 
objective of the post-1988 regional policy was to raise returns to investment in the periphery not to 
perform income redistribution at the EU level. The rationale for reform was thus tightly linked with the 
endogenous growth theory, but the practice of assessing performance has remained fundamentally 
neoclassical  in  nature,  which  implies  also  that  higher  returns  to  investment  in  the  periphery  are 
assumed by theory rather than being the subject of empirical investigation. 
Third,  the practical  implication is  that  researchers should assess the effectiveness of EU Cohesion 
Policy also by looking at the extent to which EU funds have been truly able to enhance the marginal 
product of capital and not just by means of income convergence analysis58. Chart  A in the Appendix 
55 To address this problem, some researchers are indeed applying so-called discontinuity analysis. Most of the 
applications however are limited to convergence regions, and find that Structural Funds support growth in about half of 
all convergence regions, namely in those that have a sufficient level of human capital endowment and good quality of 
government not dissimilarly from studies that use a different modelling approach, see Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich 
(2008, 2011). The analysis should but be extended to all regions not just convergence regions.
56 There is, on the other hand, some research on the impact of structural reform on the growth rate of frontier regions. 
Spilimbergo and Chen (2012) show that technological advanced regions grow faster in the presence of trade openness, 
lower minimum wages and lower labour taxes. This evidence would speak, for example, in favour of the argument of 
using Structural Funds to subsidise non-wage labour costs, see Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2011).
57 One crisis-related example being the growth of manufacturing in countries such as Germany and Austria and the growth 
of low-productivity sectors such as construction in Ireland and Spain.
58 And possibly also alter the allocation method of funds under the regional competitiveness and employment objective. 
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displays the average growth rate in 2000-10 against the GNI share of Structural Funds received by 
each country in the same period.  There is a positive association between the two but it  cannot be 
excluded that this owes to the problem of reverse causality described above: low-income countries 
receive  proportionally  more  funds  at  the  outset  and  are  also  deemed  to  grow  faster  because  of 
increasing returns to capital in low-capital stock, so that strong growth might be in fact unrelated to 
cohesion spending. Chart  B in the Appendix relates the size of used Structural Funds to the average 
gain  (or  loss)  in  the  marginal  efficiency  of  capital  over  the  same  period59.  The  relationship  here 
disappears and relative country performances are much different. In a nutshell, this type of analysis 
would produce different conclusions about the effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy.
5.2. Tentative policy recommendations for the future
First, some spatial concentration of economic activities is unavoidable under full mobility of factors of 
production.  It  may  also be economically  efficient  if  it  signal  a  virtuous agglomeration  of  economic 
activities.  At the same time, national fiscal policies perform well  their  redistribution function across 
regions. EU Cohesion Policy should not substitute national redistributive policies and/or be concerned 
with fighting agglomerations that have a benign origin. 
Second, the immediate practical implication from the suggestion above is that a larger share of the EU 
Cohesion spending should be allocated to Member States60 at any stage of development as opposed to 
regions to address only internal disparities that signal a policy failure: eg incomplete implementation of 
single  market  rules,  modest  product  market  competition,  little  labour  mobility,  inappropriate  social 
policies  and  the  lack  of  an  industrial  policy  strategy61.  All  other  disparities,  whether  induced  by 
geography  or  stemming  from  an  efficient  process  of  agglomeration  of  activities  in  technologically 
advanced regions, should not be treated.
Third, Structural and Cohesion Funds should be used to unlock bottlenecks and to smoothen country-
level (or regional) sectoral reallocation, creating also the conditions for individual regions or smaller 
territories within regions to exploit their comparative advantage, thereby making also the single market 
more efficient. By way of example, the receiving countries may use the Funds i) to support (and not 
substitute) national redistributive policies using it, for example, to finance non-wage labour costs in 
some  regions  and  sectors62,  ii)  to  compensate  losers  from  product  market  liberalisation,  iii)  to 
guarantee  appropriate  (non-discriminatory)  local  credit  conditions63,  or  iv)  to  support  retraining  of 
workers in ways that would facilitate the country’s sectoral reallocation or the reallocation of workers 
across regions64.
Fourth,  objectives  such as the elimination of  bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the operation of  the 
single  market  and  the  beneficial  sectoral  allocation  of  resources  are  not  features  that  would  be 
necessarily reflected in income convergence trends especially if the assessment is made short-term. 
Income convergence analysis should  be accompanied  with an assessment of  the evolution  of  the 
marginal efficiency of capital and some more qualitative analysis. 
59 The variable is defined as follows: ratio of yearly change in GDP at constant market prices to change in gross fixed capital 
formation at constant prices.
60   A similar recommendation was already put forward in the so-called Sapir Report, see Sapir (2003).
61   It may also allow a consistent and virtuous juxtaposition of EU Funds and regional aid by the State. 
62 For a similar suggestion, see Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2011).
63 A natural candidate is the Jeremie Initiative, through which Structural Funds are channelled to Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) with the support of national (local) banks.
64 For positive evidence on measures that support sectoral reallocation, see Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002); 
Spilimbergo and Che (2012).
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Fifth, the quality of the institutional environment is paramount to the capacity of Structural Funds to 
generate economic growth. The European Commission suggested in its proposal for the next MFF 2014-
20 that stronger emphasis is put on ex ante conditionality.  Institutional  conditionality is especially 
important. Cohesion Fund disbursements should be made conditional on a country respecting EU laws 
and with a good record in the implementation of EU directives. Special attention should be devoted to 
single market rules as a way to strengthen the link between EU cohesion spending and the efficiency of 
the single market.
Sixth,  in  light  of  the  importance  of  the  institutional  environment,  money  should  be  also  spent  on 
improving institutions and their delivery systems. This concerns in particular the budget line “technical 
assistance”,  which is a useful  instrument for  improving administrative capacity through knowledge 
transfers.
Seventh,  the  existing  literature  and  our  empirical  analysis  suggest  that  hard  investment  is  not 
sufficient  to  generate  growth  convergence.  The  thematic  and  sectoral  allocation  of  EU  funds  is 
potentially more relevant than size. It is important that regions combine hard with soft investment in 
R&D and human capital accumulation to make sure that the growth benefits are sustainable over time. 
Under  the  MFF  2007-2013,  regions  eligible  under  the  Regional  Competitiveness  and  Employment 
Objective  were  required  to  use  at  least  25  percent  of  EU  funds  in  soft  investment.  The  European 
Commission’s proposal for 2014-2020 extends the rule to all  regions for the European Social  Fund 
(ESF). This share may also be increased for middle-income countries (or regions). But it is important 
that  ESF  spending  is  associated  also  with  R&D  spending  from  other  Funds  to  improve 
complementarities across policy measures. Moreover, soft investment needs be concentrated in the 
sectors for which a region has a clear comparative advantage and in training and re-training activities 
that support labour relocation to these sectors. 
Eighth,  EU funds for regional competitiveness and employment, which amount to 16 percent of total 
cohesion  spending,  are  allocated  by  default  to  regions  that  do  not  receive  funding  under  the 
convergence objective. They should be instead allocated based on each region’s marginal efficiency of 
capital to maximise the return to investment, or on a pure competitive basis by means of open calls65. 
65 I am indebted to Philippe Aghion for suggesting this option.
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Appendix 
Table 1: THE HISTORICAL PHASES OF EU REGIONAL/COHESION POLICY 
ECC TREATY (1957) ERDF (1975) SEA (1987) CURRENT
ASSESSMENT OF 
PREVAILING MARKET 
CONDITIONS
FREE MARKETS PARTIALLY FREE 
MARKETS
FREE MARKETS FREE MARKETS
DIRECTION IN WHICH 
MARKET FORCES PUSH
CONVERGENCE CONVERGENCE DIVERGENCE DIVERGENCE
UNDERLYING 
ECONOMIC THEORY
NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH 
THEORY
NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH 
THEORY + 
TECHNOLOGICAL GAP 
LITERATURE
ENDOGENOUS GROWTH 
THEORY + NEW 
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
ENDOGENOUS GROWTH 
THEORY + NEW 
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
DIMENSION OF 
POSSIBLE (SMALL OR 
LARGE) DISPARITIES
SOCIAL SPATIAL (MAINLY DUE 
TO LACK OF LABOUR 
MOBILITY)
SPATIAL SPATIAL/THEMATIC
RATIONALE FOR 
INTERVENTION
MARGINAL SUPPORT TO 
WORKERS 
SUPPORT TO PERIPHERY 
TO COMPENSATE 
LOSERS 
SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT 
TO PERIPHERY SO AS TO 
INCREASE RETURNS TO 
INVESTMENT (THROUGH 
PUBLIC GOOD 
PROVISION)
SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT 
TO PERIPHERY SO AS TO 
INCREASE RETURNS TO 
INVESTMENT (THROUGH 
PUBLIC GOOD 
PROVISION) AND 
SUPPORT TO CORE TO 
INCREASE OVERALL 
EFFICIENCY
POLICY INSTRUMENTS EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
FUND
EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
FUND, EUROPEAN 
REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT FUND
STRUCTURAL AND 
COHESION FUNDS 
(EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
FUND, EUROPEAN 
REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT FUND, 
COHESION FUND)
STRUCTURAL AND 
COHESION FUNDS 
(EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
FUND, EUROPEAN 
REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT FUND, 
COHESION FUND)
Key: EEC = European Economic Community; ERDF = European Regional Development Fund; SEA = Single European Act
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Table 2: CROSS-SECTION ANALYSIS, 2000-2009 
ALL NUTS-2 REGIONS NUTS-2 REGIONS 1
(≤75% of EU)
NUTS2-REGIONS 2
(75% <X< 90% of EU)
NUTS2-REGIONS 3
(≥90% of EU)
ln initial GDP -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.085*** 0.006
R2 0.53 0.48 0.28 0.01
Country dummies 0.000 0.017** -0.054** 0.006**
R2
ln initial d. income
R2
Country dummies
R2
ln initial rel GDP 
R2
Country dummies
R2
OBS.
0.83
-0.032***
0.76
-0.033***
0.84
-0.014***
0.15
0.006**
0.57
231-232
0.84
-0.040**
0.79
-0.036***
0.85
-0.022***
0.12
0.065***
0.67
56-62
0.74
-0.035***
0.83
-0.034***
0.89
-0.082***
0.24
-0.049*
0.73
27-37
0.65
-0.027*
0.77
-0.029***
0.83
0.007*
0.02
0.008***
0.66
133-148
Source: Bruegel based on data from EUROSTAT. We do not report standard errors. Full results available upon request. 
Key: d. income = disposable income; rel GDP = GDP relative to EU27
Table 3: MACROECONOMIC SIMULATIONS
HERMIN (ST) QUEST (ST) HERMIN (LT) QUEST (LT)
DEMAND EFFECTS YES NO N.A. N.A.
SUPPLY EFFECTS NO YES YES YES
STRENGTH OF GROWTH 
EFFECTS
++ + +++ ++++
STRONGER GROWTH 
EFFECTS IN 
CONVERGENCE 
COUNTRIES 
NO YES UNCLEAR UNCLEAR
STRENGTH OF GROWTH 
EFFECTS OF HARD 
INVESTMENT
N.A. + N.A. ++
STRENGHT OF GROWTH 
EFFECTS OF SOFT R&D 
INVESTMENT
N.A. -/0/+ N.A. ++
STRENGHT OF GROWTH 
EFFECTS OF SOFT HR 
INVESTMENT 
N.A. -/0 N.A. +++
Key: ST = short-term; LT = long-term; NA = not applicable; HR = human capital.
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 CHART A: AVERAGE GNI GROWTH AND GNI SHARE OF STRUCTURAL FUNDS USED (2000-2010)
Source: Bruegel based on data from DGREGIO and AMECO
CHART B: AVERAGE CHANGE IN CAPITAL EFFICIENCY AND GNI SHARE OF STRUCTURAL FUNDS USED (2000-2010)
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